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STATE FOR D AND AF A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)  
SUBJECT: AU HEAD OF MISSION AGREES TO USG SUPPORT FOR  
DARFUR PEACE IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1207

[1](#)B. SECSTATE 84676

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume for reason: section 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) On May 26 CDA Hume, accompanied by USAID Director Almquist and OTI Officer Jeanne Briggs, met AU Head of Mission Kingibe to discuss USG support for Darfur implementation. Following up on his discussion earlier in the week (REF A), Hume reiterated that the USG thought it was urgent to step up activity in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Teams were ready to be dispatched from Washington to make specific arrangements with the African Union, assuming some initial agreement on the concept of operations.

[1](#)2. (C) Hume suggested the USG had concepts for operations in Khartoum and in El Fasher to support the DPA. In Khartoum, where the AU had its HQ, there was still a need for a base of operations for signatories to the agreement; they would have to staff numerous meetings in Khartoum, where they had no infrastructure. In El Fasher, USAID had already identified a facility that could serve as a base for AU outreach in favor of the DPA. Briggs explained that this facility was located near to the AMIS HQ and the airport, and it was large enough for several offices and a meeting space large enough for fifty people.

[1](#)3. (C) Kingibe welcomed both suggestions. He said the best way to secure support would be for the USG and other donors to enable the AU and the Sudanese signatories to be effective in promoting the DPA, so these should be AU, not USG offices. Sam Ibok would arrive in Khartoum with a matter of days and take over operational coordination of AU activities to promote the DPA. He noted that the UK had made an offer of technical assistance for media activities. Almquist noted that she was sure the U.S. and UK could coordinate their contributions with Ibok.

[1](#)4. (C) Hume raised the problem of cease-fire violations and the need for the AU to insist that the cease-fire be respected by all, regardless of whether or not they had signed the DPA. Kingibe confirmed that JEM troops, armed and supported by President Deby's half brother, had gone on the attack against SLA/Minnawi units. Kingibe was considering making a public statement condemning the cease-fire violations, and was going to contact UN SRSJ Jan Pronk about making it a joint statement. Hume encouraged him to do so, noting that this matter should then be pursued through the DPA mechanisms of the cease-fire commission and joint commission.

[1](#)5. (C) The two sides agreed to arrange meetings between technical teams from USAID-OTI and the AU to prepare for quick action to set up the separate facilities in Khartoum in

in El Fasher.  
HUME